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Abstract
How is economic policy made? In this paper we study a key determinant of the answer to
the question: lobbying by rms. Estimating a binary choice model of rm behavior, we nd
signicant evidence for the idea that barriers to entry induce persistence in lobbying. The
existence of these costs is further conrmed in studying how rms responded to a particular
policy change: the expiration of legislation relating to the H-1B visa. Due to its inuence
on rm behavior, we argue that this persistence fundamentally changes the environment in
which legislation is made.
JEL Classication Numbers: D72, D73, D78, F22, F23, J61, O31, O38.
Keywords: lobbying, political economy, immigration, H-1B.
1The authorse-mail addresses are wkerr@hbs.edu, wlincoln@jhu.edu, and pmishra@imf.org. We thank
Dan Ackerberg, Alan Deardor¤, Rick Hall, Yoonseok Lee, Andrei Levchenko, Jim Levinsohn, Norm Matlo¤,
Andrew McCallum, Nico Ravanilla, David Ribar, David Roodman, Jagadeesh Sivadasan, Mark Stewart and
seminar participants for helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Lee Drutman at the
Sunlight Foundation for clarifying institutional details about the lobbying process. Alexis Brownell, Bonita
Goh, Lisa Kolovich, and Craig Prager provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed here are
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF Policy. Kerr is a Research
Fellow of the Bank of Finland and thanks the Bank for hosting him while working on this project.
1
1 Introduction
Lobbying is a primary avenue through which rms attempt to change economic policy in the
United States, with total expenditures outnumbering campaign contributions by a factor of
nine. While lobbying by businesses is a frequently debated issue in popular discourse, there
is little systematic empirical evidence on these behaviors at the rm level. Estimating a
model of rm behavior on a newly constructed data set on rmslobbying expenditures and
operations, we nd evidence that barriers to entry induce persistence in lobbying across a
number of di¤erent econometric approaches. These ndings are further conrmed in studying
rmsbehavior in response to the decline in H-1B visas that occurred in 2004. We hope that
our ndings will help guide future work in political economy and inform debates over the
role of large corporations in inuencing policy decisions.
Prior empirical work on rm participation in the policy making process has su¤ered
signicantly from data constraints. Most of the available evidence that we do have comes
from data on campaign contributions.2 These contributions often come from Political Action
Committees (PACs), which can be set up and organized by rms but which must raise money
from voluntary donations from individuals. These studies have addressed such questions as
the correlation between political activity and rm size as well as the e¤ect that contributions
have on a rms stock market price. Little work has been done, however, either empirically
or theoretically, in looking at the determinants of rm e¤orts in a dynamic context. With
the exception of Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011), the empirical literature on the role of
interest groups in shaping immigration policy is also quite thin.
We argue that up front costs and returns to experience both act as barriers to entry
to beginning to lobby. While these mechanisms have been studied in prior work, their
importance in potentially inducing state dependence in lobbying is an open question. A
priori, there are reasons to believe that lobbying could exhibit signicant entry and exit over
time. For example, the maxim that "a week is a lifetime in politics" suggests that rms
might only lobby when legislation directly a¤ecting them is actively being considered. This
could induce signicant entry and exit based on the changing political environment. This
2See Grenzke (1989), Grier, Munger, and Roberts (1994), Romer and Snyder (1994), Hansen and Mitchell
(2000), Chen, Parsley, and Yang (2010), and Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010). Studies of politically
connected rms include Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006), Faccio, McConnell, and Masulis (2006), Fisman,
Fisman, Galef, and Khurana (2006), Jayachandran (2006), Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar (2011),
and Coates (2011). For discussions of the lobbying process, see Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder
(2003) and Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011). Recent rm-level empirical work on lobbying includes Igan,
Mishra, and Tressel (2011) and Chen, Parsley, and Wang (2010). The literature on the political economy
of trade, in contrast, is much further developed theoretically and empirically (e.g., Grossman and Helpman
1994, Goldberg and Maggi 1999, Mitra 1999, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000, Bombardini and Trebbi
2011).
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intuition comes out of our model below; if there are no returns to experience or up front costs
of engaging in lobbying, rms should base their decisions of whether or not to lobby solely
on what is most protable in the current period. Much of the work in political economy,
both theoretically and empirically, also does not consider the e¤ects of these costs.3
There are several reasons why rms might benet from experience in lobbying. The
political science literature has long stressed the importance of establishing continuing rela-
tionships with policy makers for the e¤ectiveness of interest groupse¤orts. In the context
of PAC contributions, Snyder (1992) has suggested that "...contributors must develop a rela-
tionship of mutual trust and respect with o¢ ce holders in order to receive tangible rewards
for their contributions." A similar dynamic may be at play with lobbying as well. For
example, to the extent that lobbying represents a legislative subsidy to sympathetic policy
makers (Deardor¤ and Hall 2006), politicians may require an initial investment of time and
resources to signal a rms willingness to support them. It has also been suggested that rms
may become more e¤ective at lobbying over time, as they learn more about the process and
the most e¤ective ways to pursue their interests. The legal rules about lobbying can be quite
complex and several studies have noted that managers of rms often need to invest signi-
cant time in learning about the process when the rm begins lobbying.4 Firms may also gain
from learning about policy makers private dispositions, which may not be fully reected in
their public positions (e.g., how much time they are willing to spend on a particular issue).
As the costs of learning and establishing relationships with policy makers are likely to be
the highest in a rms rst several years of lobbying, we consider them as barriers to entry.
The idea that there are up front costs to engaging in lobbying has also had a signicant
history. Such costs could include: the initial costs of searching for and hiring the right
lobbyists; educating these new hires about the details of the rms interests; developing
a lobbying agenda; researching what potential allies and opponents are lobbying for; and
investigating how best to attempt to a¤ect the political process (e.g., in which policy makers
to invest). Salamon and Siegfried (1977) cite evidence from Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963)
to argue that ". . . rm size is an important determinant of the political activity of executives,
since the executives of large rms could a¤ord the luxury of hiring sta¤s and taking the time
to inform themselves about policy issues. What makes the absolute size of available resources,
and hence rm size, so important politically is the fact that political involvement has certain
xed costs attached to it. . . " More recently, Bombardini (2008) has developed a model in
3For discussions of how the legislative agenda can change quickly and in an unpredictable fashion, see
Kingdon (1996). An example of a model that does not consider these costs is the seminal "Protection for
Sale" model of Grossman and Helpman (1994).
4See, for example, Watkins, Edwards, and Thrakar (2001), Drutman (2010), and Kersh (2000). The
unpublished dissertation by Drutman (2010) in particular stresses this mechanism.
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which up front costs a¤ect rmsdecisions of whether or not to lobby. She uses data on
campaign contributions to demonstrate that her approach ts the data on the industry-level
structure of tari¤s better than prior models. Grossman and Helpman (2001) and Masters
and Keim (1985) also consider the e¤ects of these costs.
To shed light on these issues, we match data on rmslobbying expenditures with other
aspects of their operations. These data exhibit several striking features. The rst is that few
rms lobby, even in our sample of publicly traded rms only 10% of the rms in our sample
engage in lobbying in one or more years over 1998 2006. Second, we nd that lobbying is
strongly related to rm size. This is especially true at the extensive margin of whether or
not rms lobby, but less so at the intensive margin of how much rms spend on lobbying
once the decision has been made to participate in the process. Finally, we nd that lobbying
status is highly persistent over time. The probability that a rm lobbies in the current year
given that it lobbied in the previous year is 92%. This fact, combined with the relationship
between rm size and lobbying, mean that in a typical year 96% of total expenditures come
from rms that were lobbying in the prior year.
To test whether the persistence in whether a rm lobbies or not is a result of state
dependence or other factors such as rm characteristics, we construct a dynamic model
of rm lobbying behavior. In this model, we explore the possibility that either of two
mechanisms might induce state dependence. First, rms have to pay a one time sunk cost
when they begin to lobby. These costs then create an option value associated with continuing
to lobby; once rms have gotten into the political process, they tend to stay in because they
would prefer not to spend the money to set up a lobbying operation again in the near future.
Second, the benets to a rm of lobbying are allowed to increase with experience. This
can reect a number of considerations mentioned above, such as the returns from building
relationships with policy makers. Prior lobbying raises the probability of doing so today
because the benets are larger. This approach then implies an estimating equation for the
probability that a given rm lobbies in a particular year. Across a number of di¤erent
estimation approaches we nd signicant evident of state dependence in lobbying, where
prior experience has a direct impact on a rms current status.
To further test these predictions, we then look in depth at a specic policy shift that has
been the subject of signicant public debate: the dramatic decline in the limit on H-1B visas
that occurred in 2004. This decline was due to the expiration of prior legislation and was
predetermined before the start of the sample. Constructing a smaller panel of rms that are
likely to be responsive to changes in immigration policy, we show that this event precipitated
a signicant shift in rmsbehavior for those that had lobbied previously for other issues.
The manner in which this adjustment occurs indicates little constraint on shifts across issues
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important for rms if they are already lobbying. At the same time, we nd that changes in
the cap did not have an e¤ect on the extensive margin of lobbying; the decline in the limit
on H-1B visas did not induce new rms to begin to lobby, even among those very dependent
upon the program. We consider the large shift in the intensive margin relative to that of the
extensive margin as corroborating evidence for the existence of barriers to entry.
Our paper contributes to the nascent empirical literature on lobbying and represents one
of the rst to study this behavior at the rm level. The results argue that the dynamic
nature of lobbying status is a feature that should be included in both future theoretical and
empirical work. In particular, models of special interest politics would likely benet from
introducing dynamics with persistence in the set of actors engaged in inuencing policy.
Empirically, selection into lobbying is driven by a number of distinct factors and studies
that fail to address this issue will nd biased results. This applies to a wide range of topics,
from the impact of lobbying on rm performance to the determinants of trade protectionism.
Our results further speak to the reasons for stability in economic policy. The determi-
nants of this stability is a primary issue in political economy and one that has signicant
implications for welfare. On one hand, it can provide certainty for rms in terms of making
investment and hiring decisions. This certainty has been shown to have signicant impacts
on macroeconomic outcomes.5 On the other, this persistence makes it less likely that re-
forms are enacted, including those that would have positive and negative impacts on welfare.
Prior explanations for this persistence include the creation of vested interests (e.g., Coate
and Morris 1999, Brainard and Verdier 1994) and uncertainty about the gains and losses
to di¤erent groups resulting from a policy reform (e.g., Fernandez and Rodrik 1991). Our
work adds to these explanations by arguing that barriers to entry induce persistence in rms
e¤orts to a¤ect the political process, in essence xing the "players in the game", which in
turn contributes to greater stability in policy. The literature on the reasons for persistence
in economic policy in particular has had a long and distinguished history, and our work o¤ers
an additional rationale.
The existence of barriers to entry for rms in lobbying directly may also help to explain
why they often join together to form associations. In particular, they may play a role
in explaining why many small rms do not lobby directly but do belong to groups like the
Chamber of Commerce. For example, the website of this inuential group touts the fact that
96% of its members are small businesses with 100 employees or fewer. In a similar vein, these
costs may also a¤ect how rms respond to changes in the political environment. For example,
Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) describe an episode in which multinationals organized
to lobby for a temporary tax holiday. We nd a similar type of response to the immigration
5See, for example, Bernanke (1983), Rodrik (1991), and Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013) among others.
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policy change that we study, with Compete America and TechNet as two examples of groups
that formed around this issue. These e¤orts, however, were less important in our context
than the direct activities of large rms. More recent e¤orts to reform the immigration system
have also led to the formation of associations of rms.
In the next section we describe our data and a number of stylized facts that are suggestive
of the existence of barriers to entry. We then develop our model of rm behavior and
empirical approach in Section 3. The results from our baseline estimations as well as a
number of robustness checks are presented in Section 4. Section 5 considers evidence on
barriers to entry from responses to changes in immigration policy and Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Stylized Facts
Our data come from a number of sources. The primary information on rmsoperations
comes from Compustat and serves as the platform upon which we build. These data contain
a wealth of information on the operations of publicly traded companies in the U.S., including
sales, employment, assets, and research and development expenditures. Information on
industry imports comes from the Center for International Data at the University of California
at Davis. Data on lobbying behavior is available due to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995,
which was subsequently modied by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of
2007. This act requires individual companies and organizations to provide a substantial
amount of information on their lobbying activities. Since 1996, intermediaries who lobby on
behalf of companies and organizations have had to le semi-annual reports to the Secretary of
the Senates O¢ ce of Public Records (SOPR). These reports list the name of each client, the
total amount of funds that they have received from each client, and a listing of a pre-specied
set of general issues for which they lobbied for each client. All rms with in-house lobbying
departments are required to le similar reports, stating their total lobbying expenditures
directed towards in-house lobbying activities or external lobbyists. Appendix Table A1 shows
the list of pre-specied 76 general issues given to each respondent, at least one of which has
to be entered. For each general issue, the ler is also required to list the specic issues which
were lobbied for during the semi-annual period. Thus, unlike PAC contributions, lobbying
expenditures of companies can be associated empirically with very specic, targeted policy
areas.6
6According to the Lobbying Disclosure Act, the term "lobbying activities" refers to "lobbying contacts
and e¤orts in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning activities, research and other
background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the
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We compile comprehensive data on lobbying behavior from the websites of the Center
for Responsive Politics (CRP) and the SOPR in Washington D.C. Appendix Figure 1 shows
part of the report led by Microsoft for its lobbying expenditures between January-June
2005. Microsoft lists "immigration" as a general issue and lists "H-1B visas", "L-1 visas",
and "PERM (Program Electronic Review Management System)" as specic issues under
immigration. Besides immigration, Microsoft also lists eight other issues in this report that
are not shown. Given our interest in studying rmsresponses to changes in high skilled
immigration policy in Section 5, we went through the specic issues listed in each report
under the general issue "Immigration" to determine lobbying specically for high skilled
immigration topics. The specic issues that are listed are often bills proposed in the U.S.
House and Senate. For example, H.R. 5744: Securing Knowledge, Innovation, and Leadership
Act of 2006 and S. 1635: L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004 are bills that we deemed to be relevant
for high skilled immigration. In addition to mentioning specic bills, rms also mention "H-
1B visas", "L-1 visas", "high skilled immigration", and the like in their lobbying reports. We
dene a rm to be lobbying for high skilled immigration in any of these cases.7 In these data
15% of the top 2000 lobbyists are associations of rms. For our analysis of rmsresponses
to changes in immigration policy, we also use data on applications for H-1B visas and the
ethnic composition of a rms workforce. These data are described in Section 5.
We begin by establishing a number of new facts about the lobbying behavior of rms over
time. We consider a balanced panel of U.S. headquartered rms over the period 1998 2006
that have full sales and employment data. This approach allows us to abstract from the
decision to take a company public as well as entry and exit into production. The resulting
sample contains 3,260 rms and 29,340 observations. Table 1 presents a number of descriptive
statistics for all of the rms in the sample, as well as for rms that lobby and those that
do not. As mentioned above, one of the clearest stylized facts that emerges from these
gures is that very few rms lobby. This is striking, as our data only contain publicly traded
companies. These rms are by and large of signicant size and thus more likely than a
typical private rm to lobby. Table 2 lists the top rms in the sample that lobby along
with their total lobbying expenditures during the sample period. Microsoft tops the list
lobbying activities of others." We abstract from the decision to lobby by setting up an in-house lobbying
department or by hiring external consultants. While setting up a whole o¢ ce for in-house operations is likely
more expensive, if a rm employs a lobbyist externally the new hire still has to spend a signicant amount
of time learning the particular needs and characteristics of their new client and how items currently on the
agenda will a¤ect them specically.
7Data in Compustat are based on each companys scal year. As discussed below, we lag Compustat data
by one year when merging with the lobbying data. With both the lobbying data and the patenting data
described later, we invested substantial e¤ort in identifying subsidiaries and appropriately linking them to
parent rms.
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with 58 million dollars. While there is some shu­ ing in the relative ranks in this list across
years, there is stability in the set of top rms generally. We nd that these top rms have a
disproportionate impact; each lobbies in every year of our sample and together they account
for 35% of expenditures. These facts also likely contribute to the persistence that we see in
economic policy.
We additionally nd that both the intensive and extensive margins of lobbying are related
to rm size. The average rm that lobbies sells roughly four times more than rms that do not
lobby, even in our sample of relatively large rms. Employment and assets are similarly three-
and-a-half times and two times larger, respectively. While rms that lobby are only slightly
more likely to engage in research and development (R&D), they tend to spend a signicantly
larger amount on R&D if they do engage in it. These results on rm size are consistent
with the literature on campaign contributions, reecting the correlation between lobbying
e¤orts and PAC contributions. Considering the intensive margin relationship between rm
size and lobbying, there is a correlation of 28% between sales and lobbying expenditures.
Alternatively measuring this intensive margin relationship with employment and lobbying
expenditures yields a correlation of 19%. The somewhat weaker correlation between rm size
and lobbying on the intensive margin relative to that on the extensive margin is consistent
with the existence of barriers to entry. If no such barriers existed, we might expect a
signicantly stronger correlation between rm size and lobbying expenditures on the intensive
margin.
Another particularly striking feature of the data is the high degree of persistence of rm
lobbying behavior over time. Given that a rm lobbied last year, the unconditional likelihood
of lobbying in the current year is 92%. Figure 1 plots the total number of rms lobbying
as well as the total number of entries and exits in each year of our sample. Entries and
exits are small relative to the overall number of rms lobbying, reecting the high level of
persistence. There is little correlation between total yearly entry and exit rates. The total
number of rms that lobby in our sample increases steadily over time, with entries in each
year regularly outnumbering exits. This pattern is consistent with the ndings of Blanes i
Vidal, Dracaz, and Fons-Rosen (2012), who document that total lobbying expenditures were
roughly twice as large in 2006 as they were in 1998.
In Figure 2 we graph the persistence levels for the main two-digit North American In-
dustrial Classication System (NAICS) industries in our sample, with all sectors having a
persistence rate above 80%. We nd similar results when considering variation in lobbying
across the rm size distribution. Partitioning the data into quintiles using the sales distrib-
ution of those that lobby, we nd that the level of persistence across each of the categories
is above 88%. We also nd similar results across employment quintiles. Firms that engage
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in R&D and those that do not have persistence levels of 93% and 90% respectively, further
suggesting that this stability in lobbying status is unlikely to be driven primarily by rm
characteristics.
As noted above, the two facts that (i) lobbying status is highly persistent over time,
and (ii) lobbying is strongly associated with rm size, mean that the intensive margin of
lobbying dominates annual changes in lobbying expenditures. Thus, in a typical year 96% of
expenditures were made by rms that lobbied in the previous year. To get a sense of how this
persistence a¤ects aggregate expenditures over time, Figure 3 plots the total amount spent
on lobbying based on which year rms rst began lobbying in the sample. The vast majority
of resources spent over time are accounted for by rms that were lobbying at the beginning of
the sample, and this remains true even by the end of our sample eight years later. We think
that this stability in rmse¤orts points to a political dynamic that encourages stability in
policy.
In Figure 4 we plot the median lobbying expenditures for rms in each year after they
begin lobbying, conditional on continuing to lobby. If up front costs exist, it would make
sense for rms to enter lobbying when the size of their potential e¤orts reaches a certain scale.
Thus, initial expenditures would be of at least modest size. If the returns to lobbying increase
with experience, it would make sense for rms to increase expenditures as they become more
well-connected and learn more about the political environment. We construct this gure by
considering rms that began lobbying after the start of our sample and continued lobbying
in each year afterwards until the end of our sample. Outlays jump up initially to $74,000 and
then rise steadily to approximately $200,000, staying roughly at thereafter. This pattern of
starting out with modest lobbying and then increasing expenditures with time holds when
looking at detrended values and mean values as well. We interpret these trends as preliminary
evidence of the types of barriers to entry that we consider.
One central concern in studying the dynamics of rm lobbying is measurement error in the
variable for lobbying status. Under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, lobbying rms are required
to provide a good-faith estimate rounded to the nearest $20,000 of all lobbying-related income
in each six-month period. Likewise, organizations that hire lobbyists must provide a good-
faith estimate rounded to the nearest $20,000 of all lobbying-related expenditures in a six-
month period. An organization that spends less than $10,000 in any six-month period does
not have to state its expenditures; if lobbying is not disclosed in such cases, the gure
is reported in the data as zero. Thus as long as a rm spent $20,000 or more in a given
year, lobbying status will be correctly observed. Looking at the data, average yearly lobbying
expenditures for active rms are $475,000 and the median value is $164,000. 95% of rm-year
observations that report positive lobbying expenditures list amounts greater than $32,000.
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We see little clustering around the $20,000 threshold; much of the remaining observations
report expenditures of less than $20,000, either due to costs of more than $10,000 in a six-
month period or reporting even when it is not required. As a result, we think that the
measurement error induced by reporting requirements is likely to be minimal.
Considering the composition of these expenditures, the average number of issues for which
these rms lobbied is 4.3 and the median is 2. These gures decline somewhat over the sample
period, such that the increase in total lobbying expenditures found in Figure 3 comes from
expansions in the amount spent per issue and the number of rms that lobby. In particular,
the total increase in expenditures in our sample can be attributed to a 77% increase in the
number of rms lobbying, a 20% decrease in the average number of issues lobbied for, and
a 37% increase in the average amount spent per issue. There is also substantial variation in
the number of issues lobbied for, even conditional on expenditures. The correlation between
these two measures is 55%. Notably, there is signicantly less persistence in lobbying for
particular issues than there is for overall lobbying status. Fully 60% of rms that lobby
across adjacent years switch the set of issues that they report.
Table 3 provides a list of the top ten issues that are lobbied for overall as well as for by
companies in our sample. We rank the issues based on a rough estimate of the percentage
of total lobbying expenditures going to these issues. We develop this gure by dividing the
amount spent by a rm in each year by the total number of issues for which it reported. We
then apportion the amount equally to each issue and then aggregate to get a total gure.
Thus, according to this rough estimate, 9.2% of total lobbying expenditures by these rms is
on subjects relating to taxes. We nd a similar ranking when just considering the frequency
of how often lobbying rms list each issue.
The top issues that the companies in our sample lobby for are similar to overall lobbying
e¤orts, with some extra emphasis on Defense and Patenting. Columns (3) and (4) demon-
strate that this di¤erence is primarily driven by the rms in our sample that engage in R&D
activity. These ndings also suggest that what rms lobby for is closely related to their spe-
cic characteristics and that rms should be more sensitive to policy developments that have
an impact on their particular interests. We return to these issues below. In contrast, very
similar gures for the most important issues are found across election years vs. non-election
years, pointing to a dynamic in which elections in and of themselves do not dramatically
shift the set of issues on which rms lobby in the aggregate.
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3 Model and Estimation Approach
To better understand the determinants of the dynamics of lobbying, we consider a model of
rm behavior. Our work extends the approach used in the literature on international trade.8
We incorporate two mechanisms that could induce persistence in lobbying the e¤ects of
sunk entry costs and returns to experience. If there are up front costs to beginning to lobby,
then there should be an option value associated with being involved in the political process.
Additionally, if there are returns to experience in lobbying, rms have added incentives to
continue lobbying once they begin.
We begin by dening it (pt; sit; Ait) as the additional prots that rm i could make in
year t if it lobbies. This level is dependent on (i) exogenous processes pt, such as the business
cycle and political climate, (ii) rm-level state variables sit, such as the capital stock, and
(iii) the rms experience in lobbying Ait. In dening it (pt; sit; Ait) as the additional prot
that a rm could make in period t if it lobbied relative to the state in which it did not lobby,
the model is able to accommodate the fact that the rm has other avenues through which it
can a¤ect policy outcomes. This allows us to focus on direct lobbying by rms. We assume
that once they begin, lobbying rms can alter the amount that they spend costlessly, making
it the prot-maximizing level of additional prots. We will return to the validity of this
assumption in looking at how rms responded to changes in immigration policy in Section
5.
We further dene Lit as an indicator variable for whether rm i lobbies in year t.
L
( )
it = fLit j j = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; Jig denotes the rms lobbying history where Ji is the rms
age. Firms decide on a series of future lobbying choices L(+)it = fLi;t+j j j  0g that max-
imize the expected present value of prots. The rst time that rms lobby, they have to
pay a one time cost F0. In order to account for the possibility that re-entering the process
after only a few years of not lobbying is less (or more) costly than entering anew, we dene
the re-entry cost Fj as the expenditure that a rm needs to incur if it stopped lobbying j
periods ago and wants to begin again. Related, we dene ~Li;t j =

Li;t j
Qj 1
k=1 (1  Li;t k)

as an indicator for whether the rm last lobbied j periods ago. Using this expression, we
can then write the net prots from lobbying for the rm as
Rit

L
( )
it

= Lit
h
it (pt; sit; Ait)  F0 (1  Li;t 1) 
XJi
j=2
(Fj   F0) ~Li;t j
i
:
8See also Dixit (1989), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Bernard and Jensen (2004), Das, Roberts, and
Tybout (2007), Lincoln and McCallum (2013), and especially Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Timoshenko
(2013). The model can easily be extended to include a cost of exiting. The coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying
status,  below, would then also be a function of these costs.
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Given this expression, we can write the rms dynamic problem. It selects the sequence
L
(+)
it that maximizes the expected present value of payo¤s today subject to the discount rate
. Denoting Et () as the expected value in period t conditional on the information set 
it,
we can thus write
Vit (
it) = max
L
(+)
it
Et
 1X
j=t
j tRij j 
it
!
:
In a dynamic programming context, we can additionally write the rms choice of whether
or not to lobby today Lit as the value that meets the following condition
Vit (
it) = max
Lit
Rit

L
( )
it

+   Et
n
Vi;t+1 (
i;t+1) j L( )it
o
:
Using our expression for Rit

L
( )
it

from above and comparing the di¤erence in the net
benets between choosing Lit = 1 versus Lit = 0, the rm will lobby in the current period if
it (pt; sit; Ait) +  [Et (Vi;t+1 (
i;t+1) j Lit = 1)  Et (Vi;t+1 (
i;t+1) j Lit = 0)]  (1)
F0   F0  Lit 1 +
XJi
j=2
(Fj   F0) ~Li;t j:
Here the term  [Et (Vi;t+1 j Lit = 1)  Et (Vi;t+1 j Lit = 0)] represents the option value asso-
ciated with being able to lobby tomorrow without having to pay the up front entry cost,
which is dependent on expectations about future benets. We can use the expression in (1)
to estimate the determinants of lobbying. In order to simplify notation, we rst dene
it  it (pt; sit; Ait) +  [Et (Vi;t+1 (
i;t+1) j Lit = 1)  Et (Vi;t+1 (
i;t+1) j Lit = 0)] :
This provides an expression for the expected benets that the rm plans to receive if it
lobbies today. We can then write the rms choice as a binary decision problem
Lit =
(
1 it   F0 + F0  Lit 1 +
PJi
j=2 (F0   Fj) ~Li;t j  0
0 otherwise
To proceed with estimation, we need to develop an estimate of (it   F0). This term is
likely to be determined by a number of factors, including characteristics such as rm size,
experience in lobbying, and industry status as well as external time-varying factors such as
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the election cycle. We thus parameterize it   F0 with the functional form
it   F0  i + 1Lit 1 + 2Lit 1Lit 2 + 3Lit 1Lit 2Lit 3 + 4Lit 1Lit 2Lit 3Lit 4 +
2 ~Li;t 2 + 3 ~Li;t 3 +X
0
it + t + "it:
We assume that the rm eventually experiences diminishing marginal returns from lobbying
experience, such that after four years of lobbying the marginal e¤ect of an extra year of
lobbying is negligibly small. We come to similar conclusions when alternatively extending
these controls back ve years. We also account for the fact that the benets to experience
for a rm may not fully dissipate upon exiting from lobbying. The term i controls for un-
observed time-invariant characteristics. These e¤ects will account for a signicant amount of
the variation in rmsindustry characteristics and geographic locations. t similarly controls
for year e¤ects, such as the business cycle and changes in the overall political environment.
The term X 0it accounts for shifts in rm characteristics, including the logarithms of sales,
employees, R&D expenditures, and the level of industry imports. These variables will allow
us to account for changes in rm size and issues related to intellectual property rights. It is
worth noting that the variables in it   F0 will a¤ect the rms choice to lobby based both
on how they inuence the current level of prots as well as the option value associated with
having already established a presence in the policy making process. Thus, even if lobbying
may not yield signicant returns today, it may be wise to begin lobbying as an investment
in future political outcomes.
This approximation then leads to the estimating equation
Lit = i +   Lit 1 + 2Lit 1Lit 2 + 3Lit 1Lit 2Lit 3 + 4Lit 1Lit 2Lit 3Lit 4 +
2  ~Li;t 2 + 3  ~Li;t 3 +X 0it + t + "it, (2)
where  = 1+F0 and j = j + (F0   Fj). The estimates of di¤erent parameters will allow
us to better understand the determinants of lobbying. For example, if  is estimated to be
di¤erent than zero, this would suggest a role for sunk costs, returns to experience, or both.
4 Model Estimation Results
Table 4 presents the results from estimating the specication in (2). Consistently estimating
dynamic panel data models is an active area of research, often requiring particular parametric
restrictions. As such, we consider several di¤erent approaches. We begin by considering a
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linear probability model in which the dependent variable is the indicator Lit for whether or
not rm i lobbied in year t. As a rst pass, column (1) presents simple correlation results for
the rm characteristics most closely associated with lobbying status. The regression includes
controls for three-digit NAICS industry, state, and year xed e¤ects. The state and industry
xed e¤ects correspond to the primary ones for the rm, although operations may exist
elsewhere. Across columns (1)-(5), robust standard errors are clustered at the level of the
rm and rm characteristics are lagged by one year. We nd similar results when including
longer lags or when dropping these controls entirely. Consistent with our results in Table
1, we nd statistically signicant evidence of a positive association between lobbying status
and sales, employment, and R&D expenditures. The level of industry imports, measured at
the four-digit level, demonstrates a positive relationship but is not statistically signicant.9
We next estimate the specication in equation (2) using a within xed e¤ects estimator
that includes a rst lag of the dependent variable. This approach is attractive in that it
dispenses with a number of the parametric assumptions inherent in using the estimators that
we will consider next. Given the length of the panel (T = 9), however, Nickell bias should
lead to a lower estimated coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status. The results are reported in
column (2). While giving a smaller coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status than what we will
nd using other approaches, the estimation provides economically and statistically signicant
evidence in favor of the existence of state dependence. Controlling for other factors, lobbying
in the previous period is estimated to raise the probability that a rm lobbies today by
44 percent. In a similar vein, we also considered estimating the specication in (2) with
the conditional xed e¤ects logit estimator of Chamberlain (1980). This approach yields
statistically signicant evidence of state dependence as well.
In columns (3)-(5) we consider estimating the specication in (2) with the approach of
Blundell and Bond (1998). This approach is attractive in that it provides for a exible
treatment of the e¤ect of prior lobbying status on current decisions, allows for correlation
between our time varying covariates in Xit and the rm xed e¤ect i, and does not specify
a parametric distribution for i. Lags of order two are used as instruments and the initial
periods where we can rst observe lobbying status are used as pre-sample years. With each
of these specications, the coe¢ cients on lagged lobbying status are found to be economi-
cally important and statistically signicant. In columns (4) and (5) we include additional
9We exclude large conglomerate rms in Compustat in our baseline specication due to the di¢ culty of
assigning them to particular industries. Our results are robust to their inclusion by dening these rms as
constituting their own industry. Similar to other studies, we code a minimal value of R&D expenditures for
those observations with missing or zero values. We nd comparable results when excluding this covariate
from the estimations. Roodman (2006) reviews at length the estimation of dynamic panel data models that
we consider next.
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controls for prior lobbying status, mostly nding relatively small e¤ects that are statistically
insignicant. The results yield comparable estimates for the coe¢ cient  as in column (3).
We further nd statistically signicant results for  with the estimator of Arellano and Bond
(1991), although these results are more sensitive across variants.
We next step outside of the linear probability model and consider a random e¤ects dy-
namic probit estimator using the approach of Butler and Mo¢ tt (1982). This has the
advantage of bounding our predicted values between zero and one and provides a benchmark
for our estimations in column (7). It does, however, necessitate specifying a parametric dis-
tribution for i and assumes that the error term is serially uncorrelated. We include Lit 1 as
a control for prior lobbying status and following Mundlak (1978) we assume i = X
0
i +  i,
where  i  iidN
 
0; 2

and are independent of Xit and "it for all i and t. This allows us
to account for a greater amount of rm heterogeneity by including time means of the X
variables in estimation. We also nd similar results when dropping these controls entirely.
The remaining e¤ect  i is integrated out using Gaussian-Hermite quadrature. Measures of
pre-period sales, employment, research and development expenditures, and industry imports
are used in the initial conditions equation following the approach of Heckman (1981b). As
a consequence, we lose some observations moving from the sample considered in columns
(1)-(5).
We present the results in column (6). While the estimated coe¢ cients here have a
di¤erent interpretation as those in columns (2)-(5), we again nd statistically signicant
evidence of state dependence. In order to better understand the magnitudes of the estimates,
we calculated the average partial e¤ect (APE) of Lit 1 on P (Lit = 1) implied by our results.
We begin by calculating p1 = 1n
Pn
i=1f(^ + X 0i^)(1  ^)1=2g and p0 = 1n
Pn
i=1f( X 0i^)(1 
^)1=2g, where ^ = ^2=(^2 + ^2") and  () is the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution. Our estimate of ^ is 0:62 with a standard error of 0:03. We
obtain the APE by taking the di¤erence p1   p0. E¤ects are measured for the year 2003,
and the results are generally of a similar magnitude across years. We nd an APE of Lit 1
on the probability of lobbying in the current period of 0:65. This estimate is lower than the
partial e¤ects found with the linear probability model, although the interpretation here is
somewhat di¤erent. Importantly, it also suggests a signicant impact of prior lobbying on a
rms current status.
One issue with the approaches that we have considered so far is the possibility of serially
correlated errors. If such dependence existed even after controlling for rm and year xed
e¤ects, this could bias our ndings on the coe¢ cient on Lit 1. As a rst check on this concern,
we considered a test for serial correlation that was originally suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991). Under the null hypothesis of a lack of serial correlation in "it, rst di¤erences of the
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error term should not exhibit serial correlation of order 2. Assuming that the errors are
uncorrelated across rms, the test statistic is asymptotically distributed N(0; 1) under the
null hypothesis. In each of our estimations in columns (3)-(5) we do not reject the null, as
none of the test statistics approach the threshold value of 1.96. Intuitively, the magnitude
of the test statistic declines as we progressively add additional controls for prior lobbying
status. One issue with this approach, however, is that the test statistic can fail to reject the
null too often at low levels of serial correlation. As a second way of checking our results
against this concern, for our estimations using the approach of Blundell and Bond (1998) we
considered using lags of order 3 in estimation instead of lags of order 2. This type of approach
was suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) as a way of consistently estimating parameters
when the error term follows a moving average process of nite order. We come to similar
conclusions when considering this alternative approach, suggesting that serial correlation in
the error term is unlikely to be driving our results.
Another way of dealing with this issue is to consider an approach that assumes a particular
structure for serial correlation in the error term. Here we consider a simulated maximum
likelihood estimator based on the GHK algorithm of Geweke, Hajivassiliou, and Keane.10
This random e¤ects dynamic probit approach takes advantage of the fact that the likelihood
of an observed sequence of outcomes can be expressed as the product of recursively dened
conditional probabilities. In column (7) we consider results where we assume that the error
term "it follows an AR(1) process. We nd similar results if we alternatively assume that "it
follows an MA(1) process. We include time means of rm characteristics as in column (6)
and come to similar conclusions when excluding these controls entirely. Antithetic sampling
is used in order to improve e¢ ciency. Appealing to the approach of Heckman (1981b) as
above, measures of pre-period sales, employment, research and development expenditures,
and industry imports are used in the initial conditions equation.
We nd statistically signicant evidence of state dependence here as well. The results
are similar to those found in column (6), suggesting that the adjustments made in allowing
for serial correlation do not signicantly alter the results. The estimated AR(1) coe¢ cient is
 0:13 with a standard error of 0:04. A potential explanation for this modest negative serial
correlation is the federal election cycle, which occurs every other year. As a check on these
results, we also considered estimating the specication in (2) with the approaches pursued
in columns (6)-(7) but dropping rms that never lobbied or that lobbied each period. This
simple heuristic test yields evidence of state dependence as well. Across the two di¤erent
approaches in each column we nd estimates on the coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status of
10See Geweke (1991), Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Ruud (1991), Keane (1994), Hyslop (1999), and
Stewart (2006, 2007).
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1:66 and 1:76 respectively. The t statistics for each of these coe¢ cients are both above 15.
More generally, we interpret these results to suggest that our ndings of state dependence
are not being driven by serial correlation in the error term.
A nal potential concern with the approach that we have taken so far is whether the
specication in (2) fully accounts for free-riding behavior in lobbying. Specically, separately
including rm and time xed e¤ects in our parameterization may miss changes in industry
dynamics over time. We have tested the robustness of our approach to these concerns
using the estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998). We began by including a measure of
total lobbying expenditures by other public companies in the sample in rm i0s three-digit
NAICS industry. We nd similar results for state dependence when including either a lagged
or current period measure of other-rm lobbying. We also considered a specication with
interacted industry-year xed e¤ects at the two-digit NAICS industry classication level.
This allows us to capture di¤erences in time e¤ects across industries. In both specications,
we nd similar results for the coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status. These results are not
sensitive to dening the industry-year xed e¤ects at the three- or four-digit NAICS level.
Including both the measure of other-rm industry lobbying and industry-year xed e¤ects
also yields similar results. As an additional robustness check, we found little change in the
coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status when controlling for a rms within-industry rank in
terms of sales or employment over time. This rank is calculated at the two-digit NAICS level.
Dropping rms in industries that were the most lobbying-intensive or concentrated in terms
of sales also yielded similar estimates of . Together we view these results as suggestive of
the fact that our ndings are not being driven by free-riding behavior.
5 Evidence From Immigration Policy
This section provides further insights into the dynamics of lobbying by studying rms re-
sponses to a particular change in U.S. legislation: the expiration of the expansion of the cap
for H-1B temporary work visas that occurred in 2004. This event o¤ers a way of studying
the issue of barriers to entry without the functional form assumptions associated with esti-
mating the model in Section 3, while at the same time illustrating many of the features of
the theory. Most importantly, we show that the new entrants for lobbying on high skilled
immigration in 2004 and afterwards were rms that were already lobbying on other issues
prior to 2004. Reective of barriers to entry, this prior lobbying investment by rms is more
important than the raw sensitivity of rms to the H-1B program. We begin by describing the
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institutional environment and 2004 expiration in detail, including the attractive properties
of this policy change for characterizing rm lobbying e¤orts.
The H-1B is the primary visa that governs temporary high skilled immigration to the
United States for work in science and engineering. Immigrant workers are an important
source of science and engineering talent for the United States; in the 2000 Census, immi-
grants accounted for 24% and 47% of all workers in these elds with bachelors and doctorate
educations, respectively. Since the Immigration Act of 1990 established the H-1B program,
there has been a limit to the number of H-1B visas that can be issued per year. While other
aspects of the program have remained relatively stable, this limit has changed substantially.
Figure 5 plots the evolution of the numerical limit on H-1B visa issuances over time. The
cap was initially set at 65,000 visas until legislation in 1998 and 2000 signicantly expanded
the program to 195,000 visas. These changes expired in 2004, and the cap fell back to 65,000
visas. This limit was subsequently increased by 20,000 visas in 2006 through legislation en-
acted in 2004 that provided an "advanced degree" exemption. Coinciding with the downturn
in high-technology sectors in the early 2000s, the cap took 12 months to reach in 2001 and
was not reached at all in 2002 and 2003. This changed abruptly, however, in 2004 when the
limit fell back to 65,000 visas. The cap has been reached in every year since 2004.
To better understand whether barriers to entry a¤ect rms lobbying behavior, we use the
2004 change in visa allocations to analyze how rms sensitive to the H-1B program adjusted
their lobbying behavior at the intensive versus extensive margins. The 2004 change is an
attractive laboratory for two key reasons. First, the expiration date of the cap increase was
pre-set in the 1998 and 2000 legislation that increased the cap. Causal assessments related
to lobbying e¤orts are challenging due to the endogenous e¤orts by rms to shape their
environments. It is especially di¢ cult to isolate the timing and direction of events around the
passage of new legislation, while the predetermined expiration of legislation provides greater
traction (e.g., Romer and Romer 2010). The second appealing feature of studying this policy
shift is that we can measure well how sensitive rms are to changes in the H-1B program,
whereas this is di¢ cult for many other issues. We can thus build an attractive laboratory
to compare past lobbying involvement against raw sensitivities to legislative topics.11
11Our working paper provides more details on the H-1B program itself along with a listing of the 171 rms
in our sample. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) describe the LCA data in further detail. This paper, along with
Kerr (2007, 2008), also further explains the methodology that we use to construct our second dependency
metric based upon ethnic patenting. Related papers include Lowell and Christian (2000), Lowell (2000,
2001), Stephan and Levin (2001), Matlo¤ (2003), Zavodny (2003), Borjas (2006), Rosenzweig (2006), Hanson
(2009), Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2009), Tambe and Hitt (2009), Mithas and Lucas (2010), Hunt and
Gauthier-Loiselle (2010), Kerr and Lincoln (2010), Kato and Sparber (2011), Hunt (2011), Foley and Kerr
(2011), Peri (2011), and Borjas and Doran (2012). Freeman (1971) and Ryoo and Rosen (2004) provide
classic discussions of the science and engineering labor market. Oreopoulos (2011) provides evidence on the
barriers that these immigrants face in nding work.
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Our rst metric of dependency is based upon Labor Condition Applications (LCAs). To
hire a foreign worker under the H-1B program, an employer must rst submit an LCA to the
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The LCA lists a specic person the rm wishes to hire,
and the primary purpose of the LCA is to demonstrate that the worker in question will be
employed in accordance with U.S. law. The second step in the application process after the
LCA is approved is to le a petition with the USCIS, which makes the ultimate determination
about the visa application. While data on the H-1B visa issuances are not available, the DOL
releases micro-records on all applications it receives, numbering 1.8 million for 2001 2006.
These records include rm names, and we match the rm names on LCA records to the rms
in our Compustat database. This provides us a measure of rmsdemand for H-1B visas,
independent of whether or not a visa is actually granted. Firms seeking a large number of
H-1B visas are likely to be sensitive to the downward adjustment of the cap and have reason
to lobby for its expansion.
Our second metric uses information on the ethnic composition of rmsscience and en-
gineering employees. To estimate this dependency, we obtained data on each rms patents
and inventors from the U.S. Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO). While we are unable to
directly discern immigrant status for inventors, we can identify the probable ethnicities of in-
ventors from their names. The basic approach uses the fact that inventors with the surnames
Chang or Wang are more likely to be of Chinese ethnicity than of Hispanic ethnicity, while
the opposite is true for Martinez and Rodriguez. We use two commercial ethnic databases
that were originally developed for marketing purposes, and the name matching algorithms
have been extensively customized for the USPTO data. The match rate is 99% and is ver-
ied through several quality assurance exercises. The H-1B program draws primarily from
India and China, which account for over half of all visas during our sample period, and is
used heavily for science and engineering. Firms that employ a large number of Chinese and
Indian scientists and engineers are also likely to be very sensitive to the caps level.
We develop a panel data set of 171 rms over 2001 2006 for whom we can construct
these measures of dependency on the H-1B visa. This period centers on the 2004 expiration,
and the time frame is also partially dictated by the availability of LCA and lobbying data.
Our sample construction requires that each rm appears in the Compustat database in all
six years, is headquartered in the United States, and that it accounts for at least 0.05% of
total U.S. domestic patents. Reecting the extreme skewness of the rm size distribution,
this group of 171 rms accounts for more than $3 trillion of worldwide production annually.
Gabaix (2011) notes the particular inuence of very large rms on aggregate economic out-
comes, and our work continues in this vein to describe their e¤orts to shape the political
process.
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Table 5 presents a number of descriptive statistics for these rms. They are signicantly
larger and more likely to lobby overall than our initial sample described in Table 1. About
70% of these rms lobby in at least one year over the period 2001 2006, and 20% lobby for
immigration. Reecting the greater share of high-tech rms in this sample, roughly three-
quarters of rms that lobby for immigration specically lobby for high skilled immigration.
This latter measure is determined by manually reviewing the specic issues listed on the
lobbying reports for evidence of lobbying related to high skilled immigration programs (e.g.,
the H-1B or L-1 programs) or specic legislation that a¤ected high skilled immigration. We
report results for lobbying related to high skilled immigration in particular, and we obtain
similar outcomes when looking at the general immigration measure given the substantial
overlap. In terms of our dependency measures, on average 18% of rmspatents are developed
by inventors of Indian and Chinese ethnicity and the typical rm les for 94 LCA applications
annually.
Table 6 presents simple regression evidence documenting the fact that rms that are
more dependent on high skilled immigration tend to lobby more on this topic. The results
are similar when we consider a more general indicator for lobbying on any immigration-
related issue, reecting the fact that the majority of the rms in our sample that lobby for
immigration list high skilled immigration in the specic issues sections of their reports. The
links to our two measures of dependency, however, are sharper for lobbying specically for
high skilled immigration. In falsication tests, there are no signicant associations between
LCA applications or Chinese and Indian patenting and lobbying for non-immigration related
issues like Clean Air and Water, Consumer Product Safety, or Retirement. Along with the
results in Table 2, these ndings suggest that rm attributes are an important predictor of
what they lobby for.
Figure 6 illustrates how rms responded to the cap expiration. It plots the fraction of
the rms in our sample who lobby for high skilled immigration along with the ratio of new
H-1B issuances to the cap. These two measures track each other closely, with the fraction
of rms lobbying for high skilled immigration doubling from 6% to 12% between 2003 and
2004. The closeness of these series suggests that lobbying e¤orts for these issues intensied
once the H-1B cap was reduced in 2004 and became binding again for the private sector.
Our data further indicate that these adjustments were signicantly larger by rms that were
already lobbying. Although only half of the rms that lobbied for high skilled immigration
in 2004 previously lobbied for the issue in 2003, all of them had lobbied for at least one issue
in the prior year. Notably, the percentage of rms lobbying for immigration stays elevated
in 2005 and 2006, even after the initial decline in the cap in 2004.
Table 7 provides tabular evidence regarding the importance of past experience for deter-
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mining which rms lobbied on high skilled immigration once the issue became binding again
in 2004. Columns (1) and (2) tabulate traits where we split rms into ten groups based upon
(i) whether they lobbied or not in the 2001 2003 period on any issue and (ii) the strength
of their LCA demand. On this second dimension, rms are separated into quintiles based on
their average LCA usage during the sample period. Columns (3) and (4) provide a similar
decomposition using the ethnic patenting based dependency. Firms in the lowest quintile
have only 2% 3% of the dependency as rms in the highest quintile.
Panel A gives the share of rms that lobby at least once during the 2001 2003 period on
high skilled immigration issues. By denition, these shares are zero for the rms that did not
lobby at all during 2001 2003. Among those that did lobby on at least one issue, the share
lobbying on high skilled immigration is very small until it jumps to over 25% in the highest
dependency quintile. Panel B provides the share lobbying on high skilled immigration in at
least one year during the 2004 2006 period after the cap becomes binding. The picture is
striking: among rms that did not lobby in 2001 2003, there is virtually no entry into high
skilled immigration lobbying. On the other hand, some rms who lobbied during 2001 2003
on other issues start lobbying on high skilled immigration even though their dependency
is very low. This decoupling for raw dependency upon the program is very suggestive of
barriers to entry. Although it is di¢ cult to develop dependency measures for the large
sample considered in Sections 2 4, all of these rms that lobbied for immigration in 2004
lobbied for at least one issue in 2003. Of the 3,260 rms in the sample, there is only one
rm that began lobbying in 2004 2006 for high skilled immigration that did not lobby on
any issue in 2001 2003. This rm, Nike, appears in both of our two samples. Thus, we see
a strong shift once the cap binds in our small sample for rms already lobbying but little
shift amongst the roughly 90% of the 3,260 rms in our large sample that never lobby.
We next consider regression evidence on rmsresponses to these policy changes using
the specication
Lit = i +X
0
it +   lnHSi;t0  CapBindst + t + "it. (3)
Here Lit is an indicator variable for whether rm i lobbied for high skilled immigration in year
t. Referring back to the model in Section 3, the extra prots from lobbying for immigration
should be dependent on events pt, rm-level state variables sit, and a rms lobbying history
Ait. We control for shocks pt that a¤ect all rms equally with year xed e¤ects t. We
account for rm-level characteristics sit with a vector of rm xed e¤ects i and time varying
controls Xit. The covariates in Xit include the logarithms of rm sales, employment, R&D
expenditures and industry level imports. We lag each of these characteristics by one year to
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reduce issues of simultaneity and nd similar results when lagging them by two periods or
excluding the controls entirely. We return to the e¤ects of prior lobbying experience below.
While these covariates should control for a number of factors that determine whether or
not a rm lobbies for immigration, given our results in Tables 3 and 6 we think that there
should also be an interaction e¤ect between the rms characteristics and events like the
decline in the cap on H-1B visas. Specically, rms that are more dependent on high skilled
immigrants should demonstrate stronger reactions to the decline than other rms. We thus
include the interaction term lnHSi;t0  CapBindst. Here, HSi;t0 represents a rms initial
dependence on high skilled immigration and CapBindst equals one for the years 2004 2006
and is zero otherwise. Including this term will allow us to quantify how rmsresponses to the
large decline in available visas in 2004 relied on their dependence on high skilled immigrants.
The rm and year xed e¤ects control for the main e¤ects in the interaction. We measure
the dependencies HSi;t0 only using data from 2001 so that they are predetermined, initial
values at the start of the sample period. The log transformation ensures that outliers in
dependency do not overly inuence our results.
Table 8 reports estimations of equation (3). The rst three columns consider the LCA
dependency measure, and the last three consider the ethnic patenting measure. Standard
errors are clustered at the cross-sectional level of the rm. In columns (1) and (4), we nd
strong evidence of a shift in lobbying for immigration once the cap binds. Reported results
focus on lobbying for high skilled immigration, and results are similar for overall immigration.
Firms with a higher number of LCA applications and greater ethnic patenting by Chinese and
Indian inventors in 2001 lobbied more intensively for high skilled immigration-related issues
when the H-1B cap became binding in 2004 2006. A rm with a 10% higher dependence on
foreign-born workers is 0.3% 0.4% more likely to lobby for immigration issues during years
2004 2006.
Reassuringly, these measured e¤ects are extremely localized to lobbying for immigration.
In Figure 7, we repeat the regression in column (1) of Table 8 for the top 20 issues on which
rms lobby. Immigration is associated with the largest point estimate in absolute value.
Similarly, it is also one of only two outcomes with a statistically signicant coe¢ cient at a
95% condence level. The association with product safety appears to be spurious. Results are
similar when using the ethnic patenting-based measure, with lobbying for science/technology
being the only other signicant outcome besides high skilled immigration. This may be partly
explained by the very close connection of this issue with the H-1B program. We also nd
statistically insignicant coe¢ cients close to zero when considering with specication (3) a
(0,1) indicator variable for lobbying on any issue as the outcome variable. Overall, this is a
very localized response given that these top issues include lobbying on labor issues, patent
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policy, and similar topics. This provides condence that our estimation design is capturing
the link between demand for foreign workers and lobbying for an expanded number of visas.
Another issue with our analysis in columns (1) and (4) is that it compares rms behavior
before and after the decline of the cap. If forward-looking rms began lobbying prior to
the decline, our estimates would su¤er from attenuation bias. As suggested by Figure 6,
however, although we do see some movement in the data we do not see rms signicantly
anticipating the decline prior to 2004. We think that this is due to several reasons. First, due
to support from within both political parties, rms had been remarkably successful in their
prior lobbying e¤orts on the H-1B program from its creation in 1990 to 2004. This was true
both in terms of the speed and the size of the visa cap increase they could obtain. Within
the rst year that the cap was binding in 1997, legislation almost doubled the cap with more
than two thirds support from both houses of Congress. Another extension followed two years
later to increase the program to three times its initial size of 65,000, passing on a 96 1 vote
by the Senate and a voice vote in the House.
As a result, a high degree of condence that future e¤orts would be successful quickly
was warranted. This condence would not have been entirely misplaced; although it was
smaller than desired, the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004 did raise the cap by 20,000 visas.
Moreover, most observers at the time (even strong critics of the program) expected the
e¤ectiveness of lobbying on this issue to continue. If rms had not been as successful in the
past and had fully anticipated how di¢ cult it ended up being to change the policy, they may
have begun lobbying earlier. Second, the economic and political climate in 2002 and 2003
was not conducive to beginning to lobby early for such an expansion. In 2003 rms were
using less than half of the available H-1B visa supply and there were relatively high rates
of unemployment for high technology workers. To the extent that rms did anticipate this
change in their behavior, however, we expect our results in columns (1) and (4) to be biased
towards not nding an e¤ect of the policy change.12
In order to address these issues, columns (2) and (5) of Table 8 next consider a more
exible specication. Rather than interacting a rms dependency with a single indicator
variable for the post period, we instead interact the dependency measure with separate
12As an example of the expectations of observers at the time, while arguing against the H-1B program,
the North American Alliance for Fair Employment report in 2004 noted: What cannot be questioned is
that, in the United States . . . the political process invariably works to legitimize the employers wish for
lower-cost, high-skilled foreign labor. . . . the IT industry has a powerful and disproportionate inuence
on the policy-making process. . . . Designing a nonpermanent residency program on the will of political
forces, such as big businesses, is an invitation to continue this trend(pages 10-11, italics in original report).
Reform e¤orts in 2004 and afterward became more di¢ cult to rms as Congressional leaders began to bundle
adjustments to the H-1B visa cap into discussions of comprehensive immigration reform that involved low
skilled immigration. This political gridlock persisted for at least a decade afterwards and was not anticipated
by rms or many other industry observers at the time.
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indicator variables for every year from 2003 to 2006. E¤ects are measured relative to the
reference years of 2001 and 2002. With this approach, we observe only a minimal lobbying
response in 2003; strong entry into lobbying on high skilled immigration did not begin until
2004. Moreover, this lobbying persists until 2006 and appears to grow with time. This
latter persistence is important as it means that our estimates do not simply reect increased
activity around the 2004 presidential election. While high skilled immigration issues were
mentioned during the campaigns, rm lobbying strengthened well after the campaign ended.
The issue became even more important for rms in these years given higher visa demand
during the continued economic recovery and further legislation to increase the cap was not
passed.
Finally, while the returns from lobbying for immigration should depend on the interaction
between a rms dependency and the level of available visas, it should also depend on its prior
experience in lobbying. Columns (3) and (6) of Table 8 expand the estimation framework
to include an indicator variable for whether the rm lobbied in the previous year and an
additional interaction of this prior lobbying status with the core interaction regressor in (3).
We demean the main e¤ects before interacting. This estimation measures whether prior
lobbying status increases the likelihood of rms starting to lobby when they are sensitive to
the program.
The interaction of prior rm lobbying and immigration dependency is extremely impor-
tant, highlighting the substantial degree to which rms are adjusting on the intensive margin
of lobbying expenditures instead of the extensive margin of whether or not to lobby at all.
This pattern suggests that barriers to entry played a signicant role in shaping how rms
responded to these policy changes. If the costs of beginning to lobby had not played a sub-
stantial role, we would have expected signicant adjustments along the intensive margin as
well as the extensive margin for dependent rms. This indicates that these costs also play
a large role in shaping the responses of rms to changes in the policy environment. We
also nd little di¤erence in the level of response for rms with large lobbying expenditures
relative to rms with small lobbying expenditures after controlling for rm dependency on
high skilled immigration.
These ndings strongly suggest that the choice to lobby on an issue, once lobbying,
depends on the importance of the issue to the rm and not the overall scale of lobbying
being undertaken by the rm. They also support the assumptions of our model in Section 3,
where adjusting the issues for which the rm lobbies is relatively easy.13 While not our central
focus, these results also shed light on a debate within the political economy literature. Some
13We are unfortunately unable to numerically estimate adjustment costs in this paper (e.g., Bond and
Cummins 2000). We view this as a promising area for future research.
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authors have suggested that lobbyists are specialists that focus primarily on a particular set
of issues. An alternative view is that lobbyists can inuence a wide range of issues, within the
constraints of whom they know. Our results suggest that rms can shift the set of issues that
they lobby for relatively easily. This provides suggestive evidence for the accesshypothesis
as opposed to the expertisehypothesis. These results are consistent with the relatively low
levels of persistence regarding which issues rms lobbied for in our larger rm sample as well
as the recent work of Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) and Blanes i Vidal, Dracaz,
and Fons-Rosen (2011).
6 Conclusions
While lobbying is the primary way in which rms attempt to a¤ect the political process,
there has been little systematic empirical evidence on the dynamics of these activities. In
this paper we nd evidence for state dependence in lobbying; whether or not a rm lobbied
previously has a signicant e¤ect on whether it lobbies in the current period. We argue that
this persistence is a result of the fact that rms face barriers to entry. This argument is
rst tested by estimating a model of rm behavior in which prior lobbying status is allowed
to a¤ect a rms current status. Across a number of di¤erent estimation approaches we
nd evidence that prior lobbying a¤ects rmscurrent e¤orts. We next test this argument
by studying how rms responded to a predetermined policy change the expiration of the
increase in the cap for H-1B visas that occurred in 2004. We nd that rms dependent on
high skilled immigration adjusted their lobbying behavior towards immigration-specic issues
in response to the decline. While the response was exible among rms already lobbying,
we do not nd adjustments on the extensive margin i.e., rms that were not lobbying on
any issue previously did not start lobbying in response to the policy shift.
We argue that barriers to entry are important because they fundamentally change the
environment in which policy is made. In particular, by inducing persistence in the set
of players in the political process, these costs can help explain the stability that we see in
economic policy. Policies might change for a variety of reasons, but we nd little evidence that
rapid shifts in the set of interest groups is one of them. This stability can have positive and
negative welfare impacts. On the positive side, a number of studies demonstrate how policy
uncertainty can hamper rm investment and employment decisions, with consequences for
rms and workers alike. Greater stability in policy making provides an important foundation
for business decision making. On the negative side, this stability can reduce the number
and range of voices heard in the process of passing legislation, might lead to regulatory
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capture, and may inhibit welfare-enhancing reforms from being passed if the reforms are
not advantageous to the current set of players. Barriers to entry may also help explain the
existence of associations of rms, such as the Chamber of Commerce.
In terms of policy, we think that our work has a number of implications. To begin with,
persistence in lobbying is likely to make monitoring the inuence of large rms less costly
and raises the potential e¤ectiveness of certain types of e¤orts towards better governance.
For example, additional reporting requirements for some of the rms at the top of the expen-
diture distribution are especially likely to capture the most important activities directed at
inuencing policy. Whether or not it is advantageous for welfare, proposed legislation that
takes into account the existing composition of rms actively engaged in the process is more
likely to be successful. The size of groups that would support or oppose policies should be
important but so should the fact of whether or not they are politically connected. This may
also help explain the success and failure of di¤erent pieces of legislation in the past. Finally,
our results support the view in the public debate that big businesses have a disproportionate
impact on the policy process.
More generally, we view a better understanding of the role that rms play in policy
determination through their lobbying e¤orts as an important objective for future research.
Continuing with the high skilled immigration example, there are only a handful of studies
that consider the role of rms in the immigration process or the consequences of policy
choices on those rms. The size of this literature is somewhat surprising given the fact that
the H-1B program centers on a rm-sponsored visa: the rm identies the worker it wishes
to hire, applies for a visa on their behalf, potentially applies for a green card on behalf of
the worker, and generally has a guaranteed period of time during which the worker is tied to
the rm. Not surprisingly, rms attempt to dene the rules of these procedures. Moreover,
they lobby extensively for the capacity to make as many of these hires as they wish. Our
understanding of high skilled immigration policies thus requires an appreciation of the rms
roles in policy determination. The same is certainly true, if not more so, in other high
prole issues like government support to automobile companies and airlines as well as the
strength and scope of regulations on nancial services. The existence of barriers to entry
in lobbying and their impact on rm dynamics and the composition of rms lobbying on
policy issues is an important ingredient for future theoretical and empirical work in this
vein.
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All Firms Non-Lobbying Firms Lobbying Firms
Annual Sales ($m) 1,823 1,423 5,407
(8,046) (7,179) (12,995)
Annual Employment (k) 8 7 23
(38) (37) (45)
Annual Assets ($m) 4,046 3,726 6,914
(30,732) (31,764) (18,896)
Share of Firms Engaging in R&D (%) 44 43 53
(50) (49) (50)
Annual R&D Expenditures ($m) 91 50 1,874
(462) (297) (8,245)
Median Lobbying Expenditures ($m) 0.164
Average Lobbying Expenditures ($m) 0.475
(0.892)
Share of Firms that Lobby in a Given Year (%) 6.2
Share of Firms that Ever Lobby (%) 10.0
Number of Firms 3,260 2,933 327
Observations 29,340 26,397 2,943
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Firm Panel
Notes:  The sample includes 3,260 firms over 1998-2006 for a total of 29,340 observations. Firm operations data are taken 
from Compustat. Annual R&D expenditures figures are only for firms that perform some R&D. Median and Average 
Lobbying Expenditures figures are similarly only for firms that lobby. All amounts are in constant 1998 dollars. Standard 
deviations are denoted in parentheses.
Rank Company Name
Total Spent on Lobbying   
1998-2006 ($m)
1 Microsoft 58
2 Amgen 37
3 Johnson & Johnson 31
4 Honeywell International 29
5 Union Pacific Railroad 27
6 Dow Chemical 27
7 Procter & Gamble 25
8 Schering-Plough 23
9 Wyeth 22
10 British Petroleum 22
Table 2:  Top Firms By Lobbying Expenditures
Notes:  Table lists the top ten firms in our sample of 3,260 firms in terms of 
their lobbying expenditures over 1998-2006.  While there is some shuffling 
across the relative ranks in this list across years, there is stability in the set of 
top firms generally.  All amounts are in constant 1998 dollars.
Issue % Issue % Issue % Issue %
Taxes 7.5 Taxes 9.2 Budget & Appropriations 8.5 Taxes 10.4
Budget & Appropriations 6.6 Budget & Appropriations 7.4 Taxes 8.4 Budget & Appropriations 5.7
Health Issues 5.0 Trade 5.8 Trade 7.2 Energy 5.5
Trade 4.7 Health Issues 5.7 Health Issues 6.8 Environment 4.5
Environment 3.6 Defense 4.7 Defense 6.3 Health Issues 4.1
Transportation 3.3 Patents 3.9 Patents 5.5 Utilities 3.8
Energy 3.1 Environment 3.7 Medicare 4.4 Trade 3.7
Labor Issues 3.1 Medicare 3.5 Computer Industry 3.6 Telecommunications 3.4
Government Issues 3.1 Energy 3.4 Environment 3.1 Broadcasting 3.1
Medicare 2.7 Telecommunications 2.9 Consumer Issues 3.1 Labor Issues 2.9
Table 3:  Percentage of Aggregate Expenditures By Lobbying Issue
Notes:  Table lists the top ten issues lobbied for in (i) the entire lobbying data set, (ii) our sample of 3,260 firms, (iii) the set of firms in our 
sample that conduct R&D and (iv) those that do not.  Estimates are constructed by first dividing the amount spent by a  firm in each year by the 
total number of issues for which it reported.  We then apportion the amount equally to each issue and then aggregate across firm-year 
observations to get a total  figure for each issue.  These estimates are then divided by the total level of aggregate expenditures to get percentage 
estimates.  Some issue names are abbreviated for presentation.  Appendix Table 1 contains the full names of the issues listed here.  In our firm 
sample Defense and Patents tend to be more important issues relative to lobbying overall.  This is driven primarily by the firms that conduct R&D 
in our sample.  These R&D firms also lobby relatively more for the issue of Federal Budget and Appropriations as well as Trade (Domestic & 
Foreign).
Entire Lobbying Data Set Firm Sample Firm Sample: R&D Firms Firm Sample: non-R&D Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(0,1) Lobbied Last Year 0.4429 0.8848 0.8448 0.8511 2.4570 2.6776
(0.0232) (0.0432) (0.0376) (0.1514) (0.0885) (0.1115)
(0,1) Last Lobbied Two Years Ago 0.1557 0.3514
                                              (0.1565) (0.1643)
(0,1) Last Lobbied Three Years Ago 0.0693 0.0577
                                              (0.0773) (0.0762)
(0,1) Lobbied for Two Years -0.0387
(0.1434)
(0,1) Lobbied for Three Years 0.0383
(0.0495)
(0,1) Lobbied for Four Years 0.0697
(0.0451)
Log Sales 0.0071 0.0005 0.0046 0.0031 0.0043 0.1776 0.1372
                                              (0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0343) (0.0334)
Log Employment 0.0144 0.0016 -0.0042 -0.0010 -0.0045 0.0769 0.0890
                                              (0.0031) (0.0015) (0.0038) (0.0050) (0.0060) (0.0351) (0.0385)
Log R&D Expenditures 0.0065 0.0010 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0014 0.0764 0.0540
                                              (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0136) (0.0112)
Log Industry Imports 0.0005 0.0006 0.0002 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0062 0.0030
(0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0069) (0.0065)
Arellano-Bond Test Statistic 1.29 0.66 -0.20
AR(1) Coefficient -0.1257
(0.0391)
Dynamic Probit Model (6)-(7)
Dependent Variable is a (0,1) Indicator Variable for Lobbying Participation by Firm
Table 4: Determinants of Lobbying Participation by Publicly-Listed U.S. Firms
Notes:  Estimations consider a balanced panel of publicly-listed firms over the period 1998-2006. In the fixed effects estimations of columns (1)-(5), firm-
specific characteristics are lagged by one year to reduce issues of simultaneity, and estimations cluster standard errors by firm. Lags of order 2 are used in the 
Blundell-Bond estimations. The random effects probit estimations in columns (6)-(7) include time means of firm characteristics. The estimations in column 
(7) assume that the error term follows an AR(1) process. Column (1) contains state, industry and year effects while all other estimations include firm and year 
effects. The text discusses variations and robustness checks on these estimations.  Columns (1)-(3) have 26,080 observations, column (4) has 19,560, column 
(5) has 16,300, and columns (6)-(7) have 27,495.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
GHK
Dynamic Linear Probability Model (1)-(5)
OLS OLS Blundell-Bond 
Blundell-
Bond Butler-Moffitt 
Blundell-
Bond 
All Firms
Firms Not Lobbying 
for High Skilled 
Immigration Issues
Firms Lobbying for 
High Skilled 
Immigration Issues
Annual Sales ($m) 14,680 11,561 32,073
(31,725) (25,555) (51,334)
Annual Employment (k) 44 38 77
(67) (64) (76)
Annual Assets ($m) 22,604 20,085 36,651
(65,144) (68,196) (41,899)
Annual R&D Expenditures ($m) 753 579 1,720
(1,431) (1,281) (1,798)
Annual Patent Count 236 152 704
(482) (222) (1,001)
Annual U.S. Domestic Patents by Chinese and Indian Ethnicity Inventors 43 24 151
(99) (40) (206)
Annual Labor Condition Application Count 94 49 345
(258) (80) (576)
Lobbying for Any Issue 62
Lobbying for Any Issue, at least one year 70
Lobbying for Immigration 10
Lobbying for Immigration, at least one year 20
Lobbying for High Skilled Immigration 7
Lobbying for High Skilled Immigration, at least one year 15
Average Annual Lobbying Expenditure ($m) 1.3
Median Annual Lobbying Expenditure ($m) 0.2
Notes:  The sample includes 171 U.S.-headquartered firms over 2001-2006 for a total of 1,026 observations. A list of these firms is contained in our working 
paper. We collect lobbying efforts from mandated lobbying reports filed with Congress biannually. Patent data are from the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office. We identify inventors of Chinese and Indian ethnicity through inventor names. Labor Condition Applications (LCA) are an initial step in the H-1B 
application process. We collect these LCA records from the Department of Labor. Firm operations data are taken from Compustat. Dollar amounts are in 
constant 1998 dollars. Standard deviations are denoted in parentheses.
Table 5:  Descriptive Statistics for High Skilled Immigration Panel
Firm Operations
Patenting Efforts
Immigration Visa Applications
Lobbying Efforts (% of Firms)
                                              (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Sales 0.0359 0.0029 -0.0022 -0.0040
(0.0205) (0.0156) (0.0153) (0.0195)
Log Employment -0.0081 -0.0026 0.0095 0.0015
                                              (0.0206) (0.0185) (0.0174) (0.0195)
Log R&D Expenditures 0.0476 -0.0019 0.0230
                                              (0.0150) (0.0133) (0.0173)
Log Industry Imports -0.0013 -0.0024
                                              (0.0027) (0.0088)
Log US Chinese & Indian Patents 0.0192 0.0172
                                              (0.0078) (0.0070)
Log LCA Applications 0.0390 0.0288
                                              (0.0117) (0.0114)
Controls Basic Basic Basic Extended
Table 6: Determinants of Lobbying for High Skilled Immigration Issues
(0,1) Indicator for High Skilled Immigration Lobbying
Notes:  Estimations consider determinants of lobbying efforts over 2001-2006. Firm-specific characteristics are lagged 
by one year to reduce issues of simultaneity. Basic controls include year fixed effects. Extended controls further include 
industry-year fixed effects (two-digit NAICS level), controls for types of technologies patented, and controls for 
geographic regions of patenting activity. Regressions include 960 observations, are unweighted, and cluster standard 
errors by firm. The decline in observation count from 1,026 in Table 5 is due to cases where Compustat covariates like 
employment are missing. We find similar results when restricting the panel to a very similar set of firms that have no 
missing data. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Firms Not Firms Firms Not Firms
Lobbying Lobbying Lobbying Lobbying 
on Any Issue on 1+ Issue on Any Issue on 1+ Issue
2001-2003 2001-2003 2001-2003 2001-2003
                                   (1) (2)                                  (3) (4)
A. Share Lobbying for High Skilled Immigration Issues 2001-2003
  Least Dependent 0.00 0.00   Least Dependent 0.00 0.00
  2nd Quintile 0.00 0.00   2nd Quintile 0.00 0.00
  3rd Quintile 0.00 0.05   3rd Quintile 0.00 0.05
  4th Quintile 0.00 0.04   4th Quintile 0.00 0.05
  Most Dependent 0.00 0.28   Most Dependent 0.00 0.27
B. Share Lobbying for High Skilled Immigration Issues 2004-2006
  Least Dependent 0.00 0.06   Least Dependent 0.00 0.13
  2nd Quintile 0.00 0.10   2nd Quintile 0.04 0.06
  3rd Quintile 0.00 0.14   3rd Quintile 0.00 0.05
  4th Quintile 0.08 0.22   4th Quintile 0.00 0.23
  Most Dependent 0.00 0.48   Most Dependent 0.00 0.50
Table 7: Lobbying Adjustments to High Skilled Immigration Across Distribution
LCA Based Dependency Ethnic Patenting Based Dependency
Notes: Table summarizes lobbying dynamics regarding high skilled immigration. Columns 1 and 2 tabulate traits where we split firms into 
ten groups based upon (i) whether they lobbied or not in the 2001-2003 period and (ii) upon the strength of their LCA demand. The latter 
is measured across quintiles based upon each firm's average LCA usage during the sample period. Columns 3 and 4 provide a similar 
decomposition using the ethnic patenting dependency. Panel A gives the share of firms that lobby at least once during the 2001-2003 
period on high skilled immigration issues. Panel B provides the share of firms lobbying for high skilled immigration in at least one year 
after the cap becomes binding in the 2004-2006 period.
                                              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0,1) Binding H-1B Issuances Cap x 0.0363 0.0297 0.0314 0.0319
   Firm Dependency in 2001 (0.0150) (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0117)
(0,1) Year is 2003 (non-Binding Cap) x 0.0074 0.0122
   Firm Dependency in 2001 (0.0110) (0.0098)
(0,1) Year is 2004 (Binding Cap) x 0.0353 0.0259
   Firm Dependency in 2001 (0.0166) (0.0148)
(0,1) Year is 2005 (Binding Cap) x 0.0385 0.0343
   Firm Dependency in 2001 (0.0166) (0.0141)
(0,1) Year is 2006 (Binding Cap) x 0.0436 0.0492
   Firm Dependency in 2001 (0.0194) (0.0195)
(0,1) Firm Lobbied in the Prior Year -0.0254 -0.0234
(0.0227) (0.0204)
(0,1) Firm Lobbied in the Prior Year x 0.0414 0.0444
   (0,1) Binding H-1B Issuances Cap x (0.0103) (0.0114)
   Firm Dependency in 2001
Dependency Measure LCA LCA LCA Ethnic Patent Ethnic Patent Ethnic Patent
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 8: Entry into High Skilled Immigration Lobbying with Binding H-1B Cap
(0,1) High Skilled Immigration Lobbying
Notes:  Estimations consider entry into lobbying for high skilled immigration issues when the H-1B visa issuances cap became binding for the private sector 
in 2004 due to expiration of prior legislation. The sample considers the years 2001-2006. Firm dependencies for high skilled immigration are measured in 
2001 and interacted with an indicator variable for sample years when the cap was reached (2004-2006). Main effects are absorbed into the firm and year 
fixed effects, respectively. Dependency measures in columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) use applications for H-1B visas in 2001 and firm Chinese and Indian 
patenting in 2001, respectively. Firm covariates include lagged logarithms of sales, employment, R&D expenditures, and industry imports, as well as controls 
for types of technologies patented and controls for geographic regions of patenting activity. Regressions include 960 observations, are unweighted, and 
cluster standard errors by firm.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
  
  
  
  
  
Figure 7: Placebo Analyses of Specific Issues Lobbied For 
Notes: Figure repeats the base estimation from Table 8 used for high skilled immigration lobbying with the placebo outcomes of 
lobbying for the top 20 specific issues on which firms in the sample are generally lobbying for (immigration is among the top 20). 
The reported coefficients and confidence bands are from the interaction of LCA based dependencies with the binding H-1B cap. 
Appendix Figure 1:  Sample Lobbying Report for Microsoft
Appendix Figure 1:  Sample Lobbying Report for Microsoft, continued
 Accounting  Economics/Economic Development  Pharmacy 
 Advertising  Education  Postal 
 Aerospace  Energy/Nuclear  Railroads 
 Agriculture  Environmental/Superfund  Real Estate/Land Use/Conservation 
 Alcohol & Drug Abuse  Family Issues/Abortion/Adoption  Religion 
 Animals  Firearms/Guns/Ammunition  Retirement 
 Apparel/Clothing Industry/Textiles  Financial Institutions/Investments/Securities  Roads/Highway 
 Arts/Entertainment  Food Industry (Safety, Labeling, etc.)  Science/Technology 
 Automotive Industry  Foreign Relations  Small Business 
 Aviation/Aircraft/Airlines  Fuel/Gas/Oil  Sports/Athletics 
 Banking  Gaming/Gambling/Casino  Taxation/Internal Revenue Code 
 Bankruptcy  Government Issues  Telecommunications 
 Beverage Industry  Health Issues  Tobacco 
 Budget/Appropriations  Housing  Torts 
 Chemicals/Chemical Industry  Immigration  Trade (Domestic & Foreign) 
 Civil Rights/Civil Liberties  Indian/Native American Affairs  Transportation 
 Clean Air & Water (Quality)  Insurance  Travel/Tourism 
 Commodities (Big Ticket)  Labor Issues/Antitrust/Workplace  Trucking/Shipping 
 Communications/Broadcasting/Radio/TV  Law Enforcement/Crime/Criminal Justice  Urban Development/Municipalities 
 Computer Industry  Manufacturing  Unemployment 
 Consumer Issues/Safety/Protection  Marine/Maritime/Boating/Fisheries  Utilities 
 Constitution  Media (Information/Publishing)  Veterans 
 Copyright/Patent/Trademark  Medical/Disease Research/Clinical Labs  Waste (Hazardous/Solid/Interstate/Nuclear) 
 Defense  Medicare/Medicaid  Welfare 
 District of Columbia  Minting/Money/Gold Standard 
 Disaster Planning/Emergencies  Natural Resources 
Appendix Table 1: List of Lobbying Issues
Source: Senate’s Office of Public Records (SOPR).
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